Rostyslav Pavlenko, Ph.D

Administrative reform in Ukraine is one of the top priorities of any government. The need for this reform is widely acknowledged, the pledges to complete it is a necessary component of any declaration issued towards foreign governments and donors. The successes are soundly heralded - but, unfortunately, there has been little success to date.

Since 1997, president L. Kuchma has been issuing annual (sometimes more often) decrees "on the intensification of the administrative reform," which call for unification of efforts of all executive bodies in the reform and reshuffling the existent structure of executive power. On July 7, 1997, Kuchma issued a decree to create a special coordination commission to foster the administrative reform. The commission is headed by ex-president L.Kravchuk and is to coordinate the efforts of different bodies in the restructuring of the executive, defining competencies of different authorities, improving administrative procedures and fighting corruption. A number of Parliament members and NGOs actively cooperate with the Commission to ensure the participation of the Legislature and the "third sector" in the process (never ending) of administrative reform.

In 1998 the Commission came up with the Concept of administrative reform in the Ukraine, in which it systematized the main approaches to creating a new Ukrainian executive-one that would be effective, flexible and responsive to the public. Yet, the Concept is not legitimized in any way and remains a goodwill declaration, rather than a plan for reform. Meanwhile, the number of institutions of the executive have grown, their staffs multiplied, and corruption has become widespread. In 2000, there are about 250,200 civil servants in Ukraine (1996 --176,839; 1997 -- 250,460; 1998 -- 233,527; 1999 -- 246147).

A considerable breakthrough was achieved on December 15, 1999, when L.Kuchma signed a decree "on the amendments in the structure of central executive authorities of Ukraine." The decree (No.1572/99) prescribed the decrease of a number of central executive bodies (from 89 to 35) and slightly amended the governmental structure (joining several ministries). However, this first resolute step occurred without the means for its logical continuation being specified, and the main problems of the administrative sphere in Ukraine still to be resolved.

I. Problems

1. Dual loyalty of the executive before the Premier and the President.

By Constitution (1996), the Cabinet of Ministers is the head organ in the structure of the executive (art.113). However, the President also has wide powers. In particular, his decrees are obligatory for the Cabinet; he can also fire the ministers without consent of the Premier and has used this power extensively (art.106).

The same logic pertains to local state administrations (the representations of the executive on oblast (region, province) and rayon (department, Bezirk) levels). The President has the power to appoint and fire heads of local state administrations, which he also extensively exploits.

These leverages make the ministers and local administrators maneuver politically between the President and the Premier at the expense of the effectiveness of their duties. In practice, this most often results in the evolution of ministries and local administrations into "presidential" rather than "government" bodies. Thus, many initiatives of the government leadership are perverted or sabotaged in the course of their being implemented.

2. Lack of clear definition of competencies of the authorities.

The creation of the executive bodies is quite chaotic and was exercised by the call of a political or cronyistic drive, rather than by a plan or functional consideration. Any bureaucratic institution tends to grow, but in the Ukraine, the growth is unrestrained and hasty.

With institutions being created in this manner, it is not rare to find many of them engaged in the same activity, while their competencies are only generally stated in a typical act issued by a higher authority. Institutions thus not only wastes budgetary funds, but also try to justify their existence. This further complicates the administrative regulation of economic or the social sphere that institutions can influence.

3. Wide base and artificial possibilities for corruption.

Corruption is widespread at all levels. Many services are subject to bribery, including entrance into the university, hospital admissions, telephone installations, licenses for operating businesses and the processing of official documents. However, the emergence of private universities, health services, telephone companies, and other "deficit" services has spared a number of better-off Ukrainians the trouble of "petty corruption." Yet, in services that remain the monopoly of the state, bribes reportedly are often offered and taken. Bribes may be offered to or solicited by the traffic police, by passport and visa registration offices for speeding up the procedure, and by law-enforcement officers for evading or easing punishment.

Moreover, there are several institutional stimuli of corruption. Formal procedures of registration, taxation and supervision of business or civil society organisations are complex.

The tax burden being too high, market actors withhold taxes in a "shadow economy," paying bribes to supervising officials instead of legally paying their taxes. Severe criminal punishment for the breaching of taxation and administrative legislation also enhances corruption, tempting officials to extort bribes as an alternative to formal prosecution.

To date, none of the governmental anti-corruption programs or parliamentary attempts to effectively regulate official procedures have been successful. The main reasons for post-Soviet corruption (over-regulation of economic and social activities, weak administrative control and judicial review, and low salaries for public officials) retain their force.

The situation is also aggravated by the willingness of the population to offer bribes as a way of "smoothing" official procedure -- otherwise lengthy and complicated -- a habit inherited since the Soviet times, when petty bribery and connections were the main (often the only) way of obtaining deficit goods and services.

4. Lack of real mechanisms of responsibility on the part of the executive; low knowledge by the population about their rights in interaction with the authorities.

The executive bodies are quite secure from control. The parliamentary responsibility of the government is unlikely to be introduced, as the Parliament is aware that the President would most likely appoint a government of his own choice, which makes a no-confidence motion senseless.

The Auditing Chamber of the Parliament has the right only to "point" to the violations of budgetary prescriptions, and its disclaimers are most often ignored.

The executive bodies do not operate with full openness and transparency, and detailed data about spending of public funds and state procurement are unavailable. The existing legislation on information is quite unclear in what constitutes state or military secrets, so officials broadly adhere to the practice of withholding information from the public.

In turn, the public is largely unaware of the rights that citizens have in interaction with the authorities. This is explained both by the legacy of Soviet times, when having rights against the state was seen as abnormal. Although the Constitution (and hence basic human and citizen rights) is studied at schools and universities, and several NGOs practised issuing booklets that display basic rights and ways to legally defend them, the formal character of the educational programs (that concentrate more on the content of legal prescriptions than on ways to employ them) and low circulation of assistance materials (the booklets are seldom issued in large quantities) dramatically curb the effectiveness of such measures.

5. Inefficient system of personnel selection and training.

The personnel selection system remains to a large extent of a Soviet style. The contest, even if applied, is largely only a formality. The positions (especially the key ones) are filled through nepotism, clientelism and cronyism. Clearly, this considerably lowers the quality of decisions made by the authorities; it is not rare to hear that in a unit of 16-20 assigned officials only 2-3 are working, while the others just receive payment and engage in logrolling or wasting time.

Although special higher education facilities for the officials were created, their alumni often opt for the work in private sector, because it brings more material and self-development benefits.

6. Underpayment of officials.

One of the main reasons for the stimulation of bribery and extortion is the low level of civil servants' salaries (from about 150 to 400 hryvnyas - $30-75). As the government has recognised that survival wage is 280 hryvnias (real survival wage would include housing, utilities, basic foodstuffs and closing, exceeds 300 hryvnias), the low wages decrease prestige of the civil service and make officials find alternative ways of earning a living.

Beside "purely" corrupt ways of self-support, officials often make ties with business and exchange administrative support for material benefits. These practices, although they keep the amount of applicants for civil service considerable, infringe effectiveness and impartiality of officials' activities.

II. Solutions

1. Review the competencies of the President over the executive. Part 4 of the Article 106 of the Constitution provides for the need for the President to acquire contrassignation from the Premier for key decrees, including nomination and expulsion of key officials. It is necessary to officially interpret this provision as invalidity of a presidential decree without the signature of the Premier. Thus, the problem of dual loyalty of civil servants would be resolved.

2. Clearly stipulate the competencies of executive bodies.

The law "On Cabinet of Ministers" should be finally signed by the President. The laws on key executive bodies (ministries and committees) should be elaborated and adopted. In the laws, it is necessary to prescribe the general procedure of creation of an executive body, its typical functions, responsibilities and interaction with other authorities. Special attention should be made to avoid the doubling of existing functions and creating redundant and sinecure institutions.

3. Deregulation of economic and civic activities. Enhancement of administrative, parliamentary, budgetary and civic oversight of the executive.

The number of permits, licenses and standards of regulations must be legislatively reduced to the necessary minimum (drugs, firearms, special services, etc.). The conditions and number of inspections from controlling authorities must be exclusively stated in the respecting law.

The Accounting Chamber of the Parliament should have the ability to sue officials or bodies that violate budgetary prescriptions.

Non-secret information about the activities and decisions of executives should be open to the public. The validation for proclaiming information as "secret" should be explicitly stipulated by law.

Officials should be deprived of the right to sue journalists for materials that criticize the fulfillment of their duties.

The duty to prepare and execute the rayon and oblast budgets must be transferred from local state administrations to executive committees of respective local councils.

A "public awareness" campaign explaining to the wide public the rights of citizens in the interaction with the authorities should be launched.

4. Formalization of the contest for replacement of the posts in civil service.

The law "On Civil Service" should be revised to provide for a system of free and fair contest for the official positions in the executive. The contest should include knowledge in the field of specialty of a position, as well as in basic economics and law.

5. Review and optimization of the structure of the executive and decrease of the excessive costs and increase of payments to personnel.

Committees of the government should come up with propositions of optimization of government bodies: liquidation of parallel structures, improvement of document and information flow and the like.

The budgetary calculations of executive bodies, presented to the parliament, should be detailed. Expenditures on the renovation of buildings, luxurious cars, expensive office rentals should be cut, while the wages of officials should be increased.